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**Discussion**

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## Discussion

### Question 1

Many times, states find it difficult to combat climate change and promote global governance. Being a concern of many scholars, some come out with solutions where others find the topic arguable the likes of Nordhaus, Keohane and Victor. Governments have consistently used defective architecture in their efforts to forge agreements to counter climate change. Thus making it difficult for such states to promote global governance to combat climate change since bargains on universal public goods are hard as individual nations have an incentive to a fault, producing no obliging outcomes (Nordhaus, 2020). Furthermore, he suggests that nations pursue their national interests rather than collaborate on universally beneficial strategies to the distinct countries that contribute, hence promoting global governance in combating climate change. Nordhaus (2020) acknowledges that another reason it is difficult for states to promote global governance to combat climate change is free-riding, which transpires when a state obtains the benefits of a communal good without contributing to the expenses. He argues that this phenomenon is a major obstacle towards dealing with externalities which lies at core of failure in dealing with change in climate.

Similarly, Nordhaus (2020) argues that whenever there are global efforts to resolve universal issues, some nations unavoidably make fewer donations, making other nations cultivate resilient incentives not to participate in such agreements. The outcome of this occurrence is a non-supportive free-riding imbalance whereby few states commence robust climate change guidelines whereas others joy ride. Thus making it difficult for countries to endorse global governance aiming at combating climate change.

Keohane & Victor (2016) argue that it is difficult for states to promote global governance and combat climate change because consultations held annually on this matter breed countless decisions and periodically adopt new accords with less impact on the implementation. Therefore, as much as there is much optimism in these accords, less action has been taken to combat the situation. In addition, Keohane & Victor (2016) suggest that climate change politics show the structured hierarchy that exemplifies universal relations, making it difficult for states to promote global governance and combat climate change. Similarly, occasionally, world political affairs have been categorized by disruptive transformation, an alteration that generates new patterns of premeditated interaction. Nonetheless, the most reasonable interruptions for climate are those entrenched in technology, like the new economical methods for producing energy with zero or low discharges. Likewise, endorsing national governance in cases where harmonization is less satisfactory in accomplishing joint gains makes it difficult for states to promote global governance. Since envoys often move problems from the problematic collaboration index, enticements to fault are high, to the considerably easier management index, which poses little encouragements to a fault.

Nordhaus (2020) recommends that states conceptualize climate contracts and replace the present defective model with an alternative that has a diverse incentive structure, naming it a climate club to address the climate change concerns. Furthermore, he states that countries can overcome the condition of free riding in universal climate agreements with the adoption of the club model and including consequences for nations that do not contribute, or else the global determination to control climate change would stall. Also, he suggests that sanctioning non-participants in the club would aid in mitigating the problem. Keohane & Victor (2016) also hold the same climate club views suggesting that such clubs would encourage the emergence of

collaboration in minor groups, progressively extending and increasing to shelter other nations. By either eliminating non-members from the profits yielded or compelling them to pay for the gains they obtain. Similarly, they suggest that implementing effective technological inventions would have massive consequences on discharges, implying that the active determination to harmonize innovation procedures on climate could adjust states' preference for collaboration in the future. This makes the issue of combating climate change and promoting global governance a matter of concern which not only every state but also individual needs to give it the attention it deserves.

## **Question 2**

Many scholars in the past have characterized Trump's "America First" foreign policy in different ways. This has brought in debate whether the policies were appropriate and whether in any way would benefit America as a nation. Narrowing down to Cha (2016) characterizes President Trump's foreign policy as discriminatory because of the adoption of the exclusivist strategy of marginalizing or even extermination as a resolution to a variety of the current socio-economic challenges in the United States. Similarly, he suggests that President Trump's foreign policy has been energized by the financial crisis experienced globally together with the socio-economic situations that have been ongoing for the preceding decades in internal white societies. He also characterizes President Trump's "America First" foreign policy with the negative effects of neoliberal globalization like expanding commercial polarization, tolerated income unproductivity for the medium and employed classes, and deteriorating life expectancy between white American's. Furthermore, he associates Trump's foreign policy with the increasing mass migration as an additional aspect of globalization that has endangered white employees' sense of

economic safety and disrupted their general conventional individuality, thus implementing the policy.

On the other hand, Harris (2018) characterizes President Trump's "America First" foreign policy as one that equated satisfactorily with the deceitful globalism of his administrative adversaries. He argues that Trump's foreign policy seems set to expanding American's affection to militarists' customs and armed statesmanship. This, he suggests, would guarantee that the US persisted in pursuing an advanced alien strategy even in corroding provision for the substantial transnational command and if President Trump's government failed to effect new unresolved strategies for the United States' influence and power. Likewise, Harris characterizes Trump's foreign policy as largely driven by belligerence as an asset in local politics. Likewise, Chen (2017) characterizes Trump's "America First" foreign policy as less overloaded by the Wilsonian philosophy of respecting other states' national harmony and regional integrity and using productive engagement to expand and promote commercial opening and greater incorporation with the multidimensional international structures.

One of the ideologies adopted by President Trump's administration was reaffirming America's sovereignty with an emphasis on guaranteeing safety and prosperity. This comprised leaving from some large multilateral contracts such as the Paris climate agreement or withdrawing from some multi-bilateral organizations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO). Another doctrine adopted by Trump's administration was the heavy reliance on military personnel and white domestic consultants rather than the national department to direct him on global relations (Chen, 2017). Additionally, the other doctrine adopted by Trump's administration on foreign policy was termed principled realism, which stated the resurgence of nationalistic and patriotic sentiments in nearly every edge of the world, especially in the United

States. It is worth to note that many nationals residing in the United States did not get along well with the policy because it tended to favor the native Americans.

Contrastingly, the dissimilarity between unreasonable a liberal impracticality explains a deficiency in present neo-realist evaluations of the United States foreign policy. President Trump's intolerant authority demonstrates that the imperfection in US foreign policy is not its liberal impracticality, which is the idealistic quest of an impression of liberal internationalism. Likewise, the contrast between Trump's policies with liberal internationalism rests on the persistence of unreasonableness rather than the liberal authority demonstrated by the United States foreign policy under Trump's administration and further illustrated by his policy towards Iran. Many scholars argue that liberal internationalism is no more a United States global engrossment and that the administration should withdraw from its foreign obligations. Hence, deserting its allies and agreements and, in its place, pursue economic independence. Likewise, native politics and the institutes that form American foreign policy are an influential restriction on president Trump's capacity to leave from a liberal internationalist foreign policy (Chen, 2017). Trump's foreign policy has a wide collection of diverse policy inclinations, which populate institutional situations that offer authoritative tools to repel radical modifications. On the other hand, liberal internationalism disputes that the substantial nations should arbitrate in such states to follow liberal intentions.

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